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THE CHOICE BETWEEN RIGHT 
AND EASY: PENA-RODRIGUEZ V. 
COLORADO AND THE NECESSITY 
OF A RACIAL BIAS EXCEPTION TO 
RULE 606(B) 
KEVIN ZHAO* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1944, George Stinney Jr., a fourteen-year-old black boy, was tried 
for the murders of two young, white girls.1 His trial lasted just one day, 
and the all-white jury deliberated for just ten minutes before finding 
him guilty and sentencing him to death.2 Less than three months later, 
Stinney was executed by electrocution at the age of fourteen.3 Sixty 
years later, a judge posthumously vacated this conviction, citing 
constitutional flaws within the case, and noting that Stinney’s trial was 
a “truly unfortunate episode in our history.”4 
It may be easy or convenient to believe that our justice system is 
perfect—that it truly delivers justice—and that each and every criminal 
defendant deprived of life or liberty is so deprived based on evidence 
of their guilt rather than the color of his or her skin. However, history 
has shown that this is not the case. In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 5 the 
Supreme Court faces a stark choice: ensure that defendants are not 
convicted based on their race, or sweep evident racial bias under the 
rug of Rule 606(b). 
Copyright © 2016 Kevin Zhao. 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2018.
1.  Julia Dahl, S.C. Boy Executed for 1944 Murder is Exonerated, C.B.S. News (Dec. 17,
2014, 2:51 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ news/south-carolina-boy-executed-for-1944-murder-is-
exonerated. 
2.  Id.
3.  Id.
4.  Id.
5.  136 S. Ct. 1513 (2016).
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This Commentary argues that the Supreme Court should recognize 
a racial bias exception to Rule 606(b). First, racially based verdicts are 
constitutionally and historically distinct from other forms of juror 
misconduct. Second, alternative procedural safeguards, like voir dire, 
are inadequate to guard against racial bias. Finally, the exception 
Petitioner proposes would not only be workable, but would improve 
the legitimacy of the jury system. To rule otherwise would be to engage 
in willful blindness to preserve the fantasy of a perfect justice system. 
I. FACTS 
In 2007, two teenage girls were sexually assaulted in a horse-racing 
track bathroom.6 Petitioner, Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez, an 
employee of the race-track, was arrested and visually identified by the 
two victims.7 The State charged Petitioner with four crimes: a felony 
charge of attempted sexual assault on a victim younger than fifteen, a 
misdemeanor charge for unlawful sexual contact, and two 
misdemeanor charges for harassment.8 
During voir dire for the trial, each potential juror received a 
questionnaire asking, “Is there anything about you that you feel would 
make it difficult for you to be a fair juror in this case?”9 None of the 
empaneled jurors expressed any indication of bias—racial or 
otherwise—at that time.10 The jury originally reported that it was 
unable to reach a verdict, and the judge gave an Allen charge to 
continue deliberations.11 After twelve total hours of deliberation,12 the 
jury found Petitioner guilty of the three misdemeanor charges, but was 
unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the felony charge.13 The trial 
judge declared a mistrial for the felony charge and accepted the jury’s 
guilty misdemeanor verdicts.14 
After the trial, two jurors gave affidavits that another juror 
(“H.C.”) had made racially prejudicial comments about Petitioner 
 
 6.  Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015).  
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Brief for Petitioner at 5, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, NO. 15-606 (U.S. 2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 9.  Pena-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 288. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 6. 
 12.  Id. at 7. 
 13.  Pena-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 288. 
 14.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 7. 
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during deliberations.15 According to one juror’s affidavit, H.C. said, “I 
think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever 
they want.”16 According to another juror, H.C. stated that in his own 
experience as a former law enforcement officer, “nine times out of 
ten[,] Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and 
young girls.”17 Furthermore, H.C. reportedly voiced his opinion during 
deliberations that Petitioner’s alibi witness was not credible “because, 
among other things, he was ‘an illegal.’”18 
Petitioner submitted these affidavits to the trial court and moved 
for a new trial.19 The trial judge ruled that under Rule 606(b) of the 
Colorado Rules of Evidence, H.C.’s comments during jury deliberation 
were inadmissible and thus, the court denied Petitioner’s motion for a 
new trial.20 The Colorado Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme 
Court subsequently affirmed the lower court’s ruling.21 On April 4, 
2016, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear 
Petitioner’s case.22 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The American legal system has a long-standing tradition of 
avoiding inquiries into jury deliberations.23 This principle comes from 
English common law24 and is codified in its modern form as Rule 606(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.25 Functionally, this rule prohibits 
jurors from impeaching their own verdicts by testifying on any matter 
 
 15.  Pena-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 289. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 288. 
 22.  Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1513, 1513 (2016). 
 23.  See Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 510–11 (1988) 
(explaining the historical precedent for the modern rule). 
 24.  The exclusionary principle comes from Vaise v. Delaval, in which jurors allegedly 
decided the outcome of a case through playing a game of chance. Id. at 513. (citing Vaise v. 
Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944, 944 (K.B. 1785)). Lord Mansfield held that the affidavits of jurors 
toward juror misconduct were inadmissible in determining whether to grant a new trial. Crump, 
supra note 23, at 510–11. 
 25.  Id. at 510. Colorado’s Rule 606(b) is functionally identical to its federal counterpart. 
Compare COLO. R. EVID. 606(b) (“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a 
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s 
deliberations . . . .”) with FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (prohibiting the admission of juror testimony on 
statements or matters occurring during jury deliberations as evidence to impeach a jury’s verdict). 
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or statement made during jury deliberations.26 In McDonald v. Pless,27 
the Supreme Court expressed the public policy rationales behind such 
a rule. Despite acknowledging that sometimes juries may come to 
verdicts based on “arbitrary and unjust method[s],”28 the McDonald 
Court nonetheless upheld the no-impeachment rule as “the lesser of 
two evils.”29 
One policy consideration was to preserve the finality of verdicts.30 
The Court was worried that weakening the rule would incentivize the 
defeated party to try to uncover misconduct severe enough to overturn 
the jury’s verdict.31 The McDonald Court cautioned that such a practice 
would turn juror deliberations into a “constant subject of public 
investigation.”32 The anticipation of such intense scrutiny could also 
have a chilling effect on discussions within the jury room and destroy 
jurors’ abilities to engage in “freedom of discussion and conference.”33 
Later, in Tanner v. United States,34 one juror (“Hardy”) came 
forward after the verdict to report misconduct among the jurors during 
the trial.35 Hardy stated that several of his fellow jurors had drunk a 
significant amount of alcohol during several lunch recesses.36 He also 
admitted to smoking marijuana with three other jurors “quite regularly 
during the trial,” and observed other jurors sell drugs to each other and 
bring drugs and drug paraphernalia into the courtroom.37 
Despite this evidence of shocking juror behavior, the Tanner Court 
explained that four safeguards exist within the court system to 
sufficiently protect a party’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury, thereby negating the need for a post-verdict inquiry.38 First, voir 
dire could screen out irresponsible or incompetent jurors.39 Second, 
court personnel, counsel, and the judge all observe the jury during the 
 
 26.  See FED. R. EVID. 606(b).  
 27.  238 U.S. 264 (1915). 
 28.  Id. at 267. 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id. at 267–68. 
 31.  Id. at 267. 
 32.  Id. at 268. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
 35.  Id. at 115–16. 
 36.  Id. at 115. 
 37.  Id. at 115–16.  
 38.  Id. at 127. 
 39.  See id. (“The suitability of an individual for the responsibility of jury service, of course, 
is examined during voir dire.”). 
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trial and could report any irregularities or misconduct.40 Third, jurors 
could report other jurors for misconduct before they render a verdict.41 
Finally, after a trial, parties may use nonjuror evidence to overturn the 
verdict.42 
In 2014, the Court examined the applicability of Rule 606(b) when 
a juror was not truthful during voir dire. In Warger v. Shauers,43 a 
negligence case concerning a car accident that caused severe injuries, 
one juror failed to disclose that her daughter had been at fault in a 
previous accident.44 During jury deliberations, this juror made the 
comment that “if her daughter had been sued, it would have ruined her 
life.”45 The Supreme Court ruled that even though one of the Tanner 
safeguards (voir dire) was faulty, the other safeguards were still in place 
to protect the parties’ Sixth Amendment interests.46 Both Tanner and 
Warger reiterated the public policy rationales supporting Rule 606(b).47 
Despite this consistent support for Rule 606(b), the Supreme Court 
has thus far avoided foreclosing the possibility that there may be a type 
of juror bias extreme enough to outweigh the safeguards in place for a 
fair trial. As stated in Warger, “There may be cases of juror bias so 
extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been 
abridged.”48 Furthermore, during oral arguments, Justices Kagan and 
Alito specifically mention racial bias as a potential constitutional 
exception to Rule 606(b).49 
III. HOLDING 
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling that 
H.C.’s testimony was inadmissible.50 In its opinion, the court equated 
racial bias with other forms of juror misconduct,51 and reiterated the 
 
 40.  See id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  135 S. Ct. 521, 525 (2014). 
 44.  Id. at 524. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 529. 
 47.  See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120–21 (“[T]he community’s trust in a system that relies on the 
decisions of laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny of juror 
conduct.”); Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 526 (“The rule . . . promot[es] the finality of verdicts and 
insulat[es] the jury from outside influences . . . .”). 
 48.  Id. at 529 n.3. 
 49.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29–31, Warger v. Shauers, NO. 13-517 (U.S. 2014). 
 50.  Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015).  
 51.  See id. at 293 (“[W]e cannot discern a dividing line between different types of juror bias 
or misconduct . . . .”). 
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policy rationales of Rule 606(b).52 While acknowledging that racial bias 
was more difficult to detect visually than other forms of juror 
misconduct,53 the court asserted that the other Tanner safeguards 
would still adequately protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury.54 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
The arguments in this case break down into several distinct issues 
or themes. First is the issue of whether racial discrimination should be 
characterized differently than other forms of juror misconduct. Second, 
the two sides argue whether the Tanner protections are sufficient to 
protect against racial bias. Finally, the parties argue over the effects of 
a racial bias exception on the public policy rationales of Rule 606(b) 
and its effect on the jury as an institution.  
A. Does Racial Bias Represent a Unique Type of Juror Misconduct 
Which Warrants an Exception to Rule 606(b)? 
Petitioner argues that criminal convictions based on racial animus 
are “uniquely deplorable and constitutionally inexcusable.”55 Racism 
runs afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment,56 and allowing the jury—as 
an instrument of the court—to make a decision based on the race of a 
defendant would be tantamount to allowing a judge to convict 
someone directly based on his or her race.57 Petitioner argues that racial 
bias must be made an exception to Rule 606(b) because of its insidious 
nature, ease of concealment, and lack of outward objective 
manifestations.58 As such, it is a form of bias that, by definition, 
infringes upon a defendant’s right to an impartial jury trial.59 
While acknowledging that racial bias within jury deliberations is 
“reprehensible,” Respondent points to other examples of 
reprehensible juror conduct that are barred under the no impeachment 
 
 52.  Id. at 292. 
 53.  See id. at 293 (“Admittedly, [racial] bias is less readily visible than intoxication . . . .”). 
 54.  See id. (“That the safeguards did not benefit Petitioner in this case does not nullify their 
validity . . . .”). 
 55.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4. 
 56.  See id. at 19 (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment represents a “constitutional 
commitment to colorblind decision-making”). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See id. at 22 (“In contrast to the drunkenness and drug use at issue in Tanner, which 
often manifest themselves in physically apparent ways, racial bias does not.”). 
 59.  See id. at 21 (citing Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 n.3 (2014)).  
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rule.60 Essentially, Respondent argues that if evidence of jurors using 
drugs, sleeping through trial, or drinking alcohol is excluded for 
impeachment, then the court should not allow inquiry into racial bias.61 
A rule requiring inquiry into racial bias would lead to arbitrary line-
drawing within the scope of juror misconduct and create inconsistent 
outcomes.62 
B. Are Tanner Safeguards Sufficient to Protect Sixth Amendment 
Rights? 
Petitioner argues that racial bias can often circumvent any 
safeguards laid forth in Tanner.63 First, due to the hidden and subjective 
nature of racial bias, Petitioner argues that a court will not be able to 
detect racial bias simply by watching a jury during trial.64 Second, 
Petitioner challenges the likelihood that jurors will report fellow juror 
misconduct in the case of racial bias.65 Third, voir dire is insufficient to 
weed out racial bias because defense counsel is often hesitant to raise 
the issue of race explicitly66 or because counsel is unaware that race 
could be a relevant factor at trial.67 Petitioner further suggests that 
some district courts may actually use their discretion over voir dire to 
forbid counsel’s inquiry into racial bias.68 Even if counsel chooses and 
is allowed to explicitly question prospective jurors about potential bias, 
few jurors would readily reveal their racial bias during voir dire.69 
Finally, Petitioner argues that nonjuror evidence towards racial bigotry 
is usually not available,70 and therefore a post-verdict inquiry provides 
the only real recourse to combat racial juror bias.71 
 
 60.  Brief for Respondent at 3, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, NO. 15-606 (U.S. 2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 61.  See id. (discussing that while jurors drinking alcohol and doing drugs during trial “clearly 
violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights,” the Tanner Court refused to make an 
exception to the no-impeachment rule). 
 62.  See id. at 54–55 (suggesting that an alternative rule would allow inquiry into racial bias, 
but exclude evidence of other “profoundly disturbing” forms of juror misconduct). 
 63.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 21. 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  See id. at 22 (“The possibility that jurors may report racially biased remarks before 
rendering a verdict is remote at best.”). 
 66.  See id. at 25 (“Even when defendants are permitted to inquire into racial bias, defense 
counsel is often well advised not to pose direct questions on the topic.”). 
 67.  Id. at 24. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See id. at 26 (“Asking direct questions during voir dire about racial bias is usually 
ineffective anyway.”).  
 70.  Id. at 27. 
 71.  See id. at 19–21 (arguing that because the Tanner safeguards are so insufficient in the 
case of racial bias, defendants need this exception to the no-impeachment rule to have a 
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In contrast, Respondent argues that the Tanner safeguards 
“effectively detect and address racial bias among individual jurors.”72 
Voir dire on the subject of racial bias is constitutionally required if 
requested by defendant’s counsel in interracial capital cases.73 If voir 
dire were categorically incapable of detecting racial bias, then it would 
not be mandatory in certain cases.74 Respondent then cites to a number 
of cases in which voir dire did reveal racial bias as evidence of its 
effectiveness.75 Furthermore, questioning jurors regarding racial bias 
can take place in private conference with the judge, or on non-public 
juror questionnaires.76 Coupled with the threat of perjury, jurors are 
incentivized to answer honestly, even when asked about sensitive 
topics.77 
 
Respondent argues that the other safeguards are also effective. 
There are a number of instances where jurors reported racial bias 
before the verdict.78 As to nonjuror evidence, Respondent states that 
racial bias is often expressed outside of the jury room, citing several 
examples where a juror was successfully dismissed.79 Because court 
personnel have numerous opportunities to interact with jurors during 
the course of a trial, they have many opportunities to detect racial 
bias.80 In addition to the Tanner safeguards, Respondent contends that 
other safeguards in the system make post-verdict inquiry unnecessary.81 
Racial limitations to peremptory strikes, the requirement of unanimity 
among a large jury, and the focus on ensuring that a panel of jurors 
represents a “fair cross-section of the community” all serve to protect 
defendants against racial bias.82 
 
“meaningful opportunity to present evidence of juror bias” and safeguard their Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury). 
 72.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at 15. 
 73.  See id. at 23 (citing Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986) (vacating a defendant’s 
death sentence in an interracial crime because defendant was not allowed to question the jury on 
racial bias)). 
 74.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at 23 (“[V]oir dire on racial bias is 
constitutionally required precisely because it is effective.”). 
 75.  Id. at 23 n.7. 
 76.  Id. at 24–25. 
 77.  Respondent makes the argument that jurors are commonly asked “‘sensitive and 
potentially embarrassing questions.’” See id. at 24 (citation omitted). 
 78.  Id. at 31. 
 79.  Id. at 33–34. 
 80.  Id. at 35. 
 81.  Id. at 36. 
 82.  Id. at 36–41. 
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C. What Are the Effects on State Interests and the Jury System? 
Respondent contends that a rule allowing post-verdict inquiry into 
jurors’ racial biases would have disastrous effects on the jury system.83 
A racial bias exception could disturb overall verdict finality by creating 
a torrent of post-verdict litigation.84 Such a level of increased scrutiny 
would stifle free discussion during jury deliberations85 and encourage 
increased harassment of jurors.86 Furthermore, the different treatment 
between racial bias and other forms of jury misconduct would destroy 
public confidence in the jury system87 and make the jury verdicts less 
independent.88 
Petitioner contends that allowing inquiry into racial bias would 
have a minimal or positive effect on state interests. The core of 
Petitioner’s argument lies in his evidence that in jurisdictions that have 
allowed inquiry into juror racial bias, there has not been a subsequent 
floodgate of litigation over verdicts based on such juror testimony.89 
Because of this relatively small impact, verdict finality is not “unduly 
disturb[ed].”90 Furthermore, there is a minimal state interest to 
preserving jurors’ rights to free discussion on racial matters because the 
cost of racially biased discussion on a defendant’s rights outweighs any 
benefits to a juror’s peace of mind.91 Finally, allowing inquiry into racial 
bias would serve to strengthen jury legitimacy in the public eye, while 
a contrary rule would harm public confidence in a system that ignores 
racially motivated convictions.92 
V. ANALYSIS 
One of the first lines of Respondent’s brief states, “No one disputes 
that racial bias is reprehensible and has no place in the jury room.”93 
 
 83.  See id. at 42 (“Petitioner’s proposal . . . would undermine ‘long-recognized and very 
substantial concerns’ in favor of jury secrecy.”). 
 84.  See id. at 45–48 (challenging Petitioner’s claim that such a rule would apply and be used 
in relatively few cases). 
 85.  Id. at 44. 
 86.  Id. at 48–49. 
 87.  Id. at 49–50. 
 88.  Respondent suggests that a racial bias exception would affect a person’s right to trial by 
jury because verdicts would “‘be permitted to stand only by the court’s leave.’” Id. at 50–52 
(citation omitted).  
 89.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 39 (“[T]he post-trial litigation that flows from 
allowing jurors to testify regarding racial bias is minimal.”). 
 90.  Id. at 38. 
 91.  Id. at 35. 
 92.  Id. at 44. 
 93.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at 3. 
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Respondent, however, then spends the next fifty pages arguing that 
racial bias within jury deliberations is an acceptable consequence of 
preserving secrecy within the jury system. That is, if racial bias slips by 
the safeguards in place, then the conviction must stand, and a defendant 
should lose his or her liberty based on their race. As the Petitioner aptly 
puts it, “[t]his cannot be right.”94 
A. Racism is Constitutionally and Historically Distinct From Other 
Juror Misconduct. 
The United States has not had a societal history of drunk and drug-
dealing jurors.95 The United States has, however, been guilty of state-
sanctioned racism and discrimination for the majority of its history.96 
Yet state-propagated racism is not just a bygone relic. Even in recent 
years, discriminatory enforcement policies have been used in the 
criminal justice system.97 
A rule that allows the court to ignore racial discrimination within 
jury deliberations is tantamount to state-sponsored racism. The jury is 
fundamentally an instrument of the court system98 and stands between 
the government and its ability to deprive a person of his or her liberty.99 
Allowing a conviction to stand based on racial discrimination 
“undermines the jury’s ability to perform its function as a buffer against 
governmental oppression and, in fact, converts the jury itself into an 
instrument of oppression.”100 Such oppression is as attributable to the 
government as allowing Jim Crow laws to stand or enforcing racial 
housing covenants between private parties.101 
 
 94.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 46. 
 95.  This comment refers to the facts of Tanner. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 115–
16 (1987); see also supra text accompanying notes 34–37. 
 96.  See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (“[R]acial and 
ethnic distinctions [are] rooted in our Nation’s constitutional and demographic history.”). 
 97.  See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that 
New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy “resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory 
stopping of blacks and Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”); see generally U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T (2015) 
(finding that Ferguson, Missouri local government engaged in discriminatory enforcement, used 
disproportionate force, and levied fines against minorities to generate revenue for the city).  
 98.  See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765 (1929) (“The jury is an essential 
instrumentality—an appendage—of the court . . . .”). 
 99.  See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (“In the ultimate analysis, only the jury 
can strip a man of his liberty or his life.”). 
 100.  27 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6074, at 
513 (2d ed. 2007). 
 101.  See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (“[I]t would appear beyond question 
that the power of the State to create and enforce [private] property interests must be exercised 
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Even after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court has taken many steps to ensure that the court system does not 
act as a vehicle for racial discrimination. In 1879, the Supreme Court 
struck down a law that only allowed whites to serve as jurors, finding 
that such a law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.102 The Court later 
limited the practice of using peremptory challenges to prohibit parties 
from excluding jurors based on their race.103 As stated in Georgia v. 
McCollum, “[w]e recognize, of course, that a defendant has the right to 
an impartial jury that can view him without racial animus, which so long 
has distorted our system of criminal justice.”104 If, however, a 
defendant’s conviction can stand on statements like “Mexican men 
take whatever they want”105 or “nine times out of ten Mexican men 
[are] guilty of being aggressive toward women and girls,”106 then this 
right is meaningless. This fits the very definition of tolerating race-
based decision making.107 
Considering the constitutional necessity of eliminating race-based 
decision making from the judicial system all together,108 the existence 
of fallible safeguards should be irrelevant. After all, any preemptive 
safeguard—no matter how robust—can be circumvented. A system 
truly dedicated to eliminating racial bias needs a post facto mechanism 
to scrutinize and correct for racial bias. This is the only system that can 
support the proposition that “racial bias is reprehensible and has no 
place in the jury room.”109 
However, because the current framework of Rule 606(b) 
jurisprudence relies upon the Tanner safeguards, the Supreme Court 
will likely consider them and should find them insufficient to counter 
racial bias.110 It is also helpful to engage in the analysis of Tanner 
 
within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 102.  Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).  
 103.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“Selection procedures that purposefully 
exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of 
justice.”). 
 104.  Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58 (1992). 
 105.  Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 289 (Colo. 2015).  
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (“At the heart of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens 
as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 108.  See, e.g., McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57 (“It is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial 
includes the right to discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race.”). 
 109.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at 3. 
 110.  See, e.g., United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (“In our view, the four 
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safeguards to further distinguish racial bias from other forms of juror 
misconduct. 
B. Tanner Safeguards Are Insufficient. 
Even if the Supreme Court analyzes this case using the Tanner 
framework, it should find that the Tanner safeguards are insufficient to 
counter racial bias. First, racial bias is hidden in a way that judges and 
counsel cannot easily observe or infer it from watching jurors at trial.111 
Second, voir dire also cannot readily detect racial bias. It is difficult to 
imagine a juror bold enough to declare their racial bias publicly when 
questioned in court. Furthermore, jurors may be unaware of or 
motivated to conceal their own racial prejudices when questioned.112 
Third, although there are some cases in which other jurors reported 
racial bias before a verdict,113 this often does not happen.114 Fourth, 
nonjuror testimony of juror racial bias is rarely available. While bar 
receipts can provide evidence of juror alcohol consumption, it is more 
difficult to find concrete evidence of racial prejudice.115 Oftentimes, 
juror testimony after the verdict is the only evidence that reliably 
proves racist jury misconduct.116 To deny a defendant access to this 
evidence is to deny a defendant any real recourse for racial misconduct. 
 
 
protections relied on by the Tanner Court do not provide adequate safeguards in the context of 
racially and ethnically biased comments made during deliberations.”). 
 111.  The Colorado Supreme Court conceded that court observation is unlikely to detect 
racial bias. See Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 293 (Colo. 2015) (“Admittedly, bias is 
less readily visible than intoxication . . . meaning the second Tanner protection . . . carries less 
force in such cases.”). 
 112.  Jurors can often hide racial bias through voir dire, even if probing questions are asked. 
For example, in a case from Maine, a juror was found to have said, “[Defendants] are all guilty 
wetbacks anyway,” despite passing through a strenuous set of questions on racial bias during voir 
dire. See United States v. Fuentes, No. 2:12–CR–50–DBH, 2013 WL 4401803, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 
15, 2013); see also Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 545, 554 (1975) (“Some jurors will intentionally deceive the courts, perhaps because they 
are ashamed to admit attitudes that are socially unfashionable or even because they might 
welcome the chance to seek retaliation against a litigant.”). 
 113.  See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 n.21 (11th Cir. 1986) (describing 
how jurors sent a note expressing concerns of racial bias during jury deliberations); see also Brief 
for Respondent, supra note 60, at 31–32.  
 114.  Brief for Amici Curiae Professors of Law in Support of Petitioner at 12, Pena-Rodriguez 
v. Colorado, NO. 15-606 (U.S. 2016); see also Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. 
2013) (noting that jurors often wait until after a verdict to report racial bias out of “an 
unwillingness to confront their peers or mere unawareness that the court may not consider their 
post-verdict testimony”). 
 115.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 27. 
 116.  Racist Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1596 (1988).  
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C. A Racial Bias Exception Would Not Unduly Affect State Interests. 
In jurisdictions that have adopted such a racial bias exception, there 
is little evidence of the evils that Tanner forecasts.117 Without empirical 
evidence of the predicted “barrage of post-verdict scrutiny,”118 
concerns about increased juror harassment and chilling effects on juror 
discussion as a justification for inaction become less tenable. The 
number of cases that involve inquiry into post-verdict racial bias 
remains relatively few,119 but in such cases, the verdicts are more often 
than not overturned.120 The relatively few cases—and therefore limited 
impact on state interests—show that this is a narrow exception with low 
costs to the jury system.121 For those few defendants, however, the 
constitutional and liberty interests are of paramount importance. 
Furthermore, there is no state interest in maintaining finality for 
verdicts tainted by racial prejudice. “Verdicts should not be final if they 
are the likely result of racism.”122 In fact, a contrary rule to hide such 
obvious racial defects in jury decision making could serve to 
delegitimize the criminal justice system further.123 Such a system that 
condones deciding life or liberty based on race – or even appears to do 
so – undermines the public’s confidence and does not administer 
justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Racial bias has always been an issue in this nation’s history. As a 
deeply rooted societal problem with a constitutional basis, it is 
distinguishable from other forms of juror misconduct. Furthermore, the 
 
 117.  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Center on the Administration of Criminal Law in Support 
of Petitioner at 22, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 15-606 (U.S. 2016) [hereinafter Brief of Center 
on Admin. of Crim. Law] (finding a minimal increase in post-verdict litigation). 
 118.  Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121 (1987). 
 119.  No jurisdiction, even the ones that adopted the exception over 30 years ago, has seen 
more than five of these cases. Brief of Center on Admin. of Crim. Law, supra note 117, at 24–25. 
 120.  This signifies the importance of such a rule to address serious juror misconduct. Id. at 
22. 
 121.  Not every juror comment that could tentatively be connected to race becomes 
admissible. See United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (requiring a determination 
“whether there is a substantial probability that any such comments made a difference in the 
outcome of a trial”); see also Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. 2013) (limiting the 
exception to “rare and exceptional cases”). To make this exception narrow, courts must use juror 
testimony toward racial bias to evaluate the context and possible effects of the bias. Nonjuror 
testimony would not allow for such specific determinations. 
 122.  Racist Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, supra note 116, at 1600. 
 123.  See Kittle, 65 A.3d at 1155 (“[I]f we required trial courts to ignore all allegations that 
jurors expressed racial or ethnic bias during deliberations, we would jeopardize the public’s 
confidence in the fair administration of justice.”). 
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interests and policy rationales of Rule 606(b) are not unduly harmed 
by a racial bias exception. Thus, the Supreme Court should adopt a 
racial bias exception to Rule 606(b) to eliminate race-based decision 
making at trial. After all, if the “smoking guns [of racism] are ignored, 
we have little hope of combatting the more subtle forms of racial 
discrimination.”124 
 
 
 124.  Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
